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especially after accepted and acted upon by the Suffolk Sheriff,
who would appear to be the only one so positioned as to
refuse an execution improperly captioned-thereafter fell into
the category of mere irregularity and would, under present law
and the liberal intent underlying it, have been best disregarded. A
great deal of time and effort, involving considerable expense, was
overturned at bar because, at bottom, of use of the wrong word.
CPLR 2001 could reasonably have been held to control here, with
the irregularity being ignored. The court might have so held had
the foregoing factors been called to its attention.
ARTICLE

23-SBPoENAs, OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS

Party applying for issuance of arbitrator'ssubpoena is proper
party to petition for judicial enforcement thereof.
Petitioner moved pursuant to CPLR 2308(b) to compel compliance with a subpoena which had been issued by an arbitrator
at the request of petitioner and served upon respondent. Respondent contended that only the "issuer may move . . .to compel compliance"117 with the subpoena and that the issuer here was the
arbitrator and not petitioner.118
The court, in a brief opinion, indicated that respondent's
contention was clearly incorrect and that the term "issuer" embraces
the one who applied for the subpoena in a nonjudicial proceeding.
The order of compliance issued upon petitioner's application was
therefore valid, and respondent's disobedience of it punishable by
contempt. The instant application for a warrant of commitment
against respondent for disobeying that order was granted.
ARTICLE 30-

REMEDIES AND PLEADINGS

CPLR 3017(a) - Judgment may be rendered on the proof, though
relief of different nature than that prayed for.
Nowak v. Wereszynski"09 involved a proceeding in the nature
of mandamus, instituted by the Comptroller of the City of Utica,
in order to compel the Common Council of the City to adopt a
budget providing for the transfer of certain funds by the water
board to the city. Special term denied the petition and directed
that respondents prepare a new estimate with the objectionable
funds deleted therefrom. In addition, the Common Council, upon
the receipt of such estimate, was directed to adopt a new budget.
Appellant-Comptroller contended that the relief granted was improper,
since it was not requested in the pleadings. The appellate division,
CPLR

2308(b).
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113 Application of

Nelson, 43 Misc. 2d 132, 249 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
11921 App. Div. 2d 427, 250 N.Y.S.2d 981 (4th Dep't 1964).
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fourth department, affirmed, disposing of the appellant's contention in a review of the procedural principles upon which the relief
was granted.
The court pointed out that as a result of the interplay of
sections

103(b),

(c)

12 0

and 3017(a), special term had the statu-

tory authority in this Article 78 proceeding to grant the relief it
had patterned; it was apparently influenced by the fact that there
was an immediate need for the preparation and adoption of a
budget for the city's forthcoming fiscal year.
Section 3017(a) provides in part that "the court may grant
any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof
whether or not demanded. .

."..

This section is applicable to

special proceedings, as well as actions, because section 103(b) provides in part that "except where otherwise prescribed by law,
procedure in special proceedings shall be the same as in
actions. ....
.

The grant of power contained in section 3017(a) to render
a judgment appropriate to the proof, rather than requiring that
the judgment be wholly responsive to the relief demanded in the
complaint (as was required by Section 479 of the Civil Practice
Act), bestows upon the courts discretion to pattern a judgment
consistent with the facts proved at trial. Under prior law, some
courts had taken the position that they did not possess the discretion
to render relief that was inconsistent with that demanded in the
complaint, even though such relief was warranted by the proof.
For example, where the complaint requested only legal relief, the
courts refused to grant equitable relief even though it would have
been consistent with the proof. 1 21 Jackson v. Strong,122 decided by
the court of appeals in 1917, is the leading New York case adopting this view.
In 1960, the court of appeals handed down the landmark
case of Diemer v. Diemer. 23 Diemer involved an action for separation, the ground alleged being cruel and inhuman treatment by
defendant wife. The court of appeals looked at the record and
concluded that the proof would support a separation on the ground
that the defendant had abandoned the plaintiff (the cruel and inhuman treatment ground had failed of proof). Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, granted the separation on the abandonment
ground, although unpleaded, holding that "it is enough . . . that a

pleader state the facts making out a cause of action, and it matters
120The

court poinfed out that under the authority of section 103(c) an

application for relief brought in the wrong form could be corrected by the
court without a dismissal.
1213 WEmNSTEI,
I.oRN S Mn.iLm, NEW Yo. CIVIL PRArCICE f3017.06
(1963).
122222 N.Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917).
1238 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960).
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not whether he gives a name to the cause of action at all or even
that he gives it a wrong name." '24
Today the explicit grant of power contained in the last sentence of section 3017(a) permits the court to grant relief that is
"appropriate to the proof."
It is therefore clear that a court
possesses the power to award legal or equitable relief whenever it
is "within its jurisdiction" to do so.' 25 This section has the effect
of eliminating the law-equity distinction espoused in Jackson and
followed in many subsequent decisions. 26 This is one of the
important changes wrought by the CPLR.
There is no danger of the right to trial by jury being lost
here, if such right exists. To the extent that the right to legal
relief appears at a later juncture of the action-it having been
assumed up to then that only equitable relief was being sought so
that trial by jury was neither demanded nor demandable-the court
must at that time afford to the party against whom the legal relief
' 27
is sought "an opportunity to demand a jury trial of such issues.'
Effectiveness of bill of particulars limited by permitting proof of
allegations not included therein.
In the case of Pogor v. Cue Taxi Serv., Inc.,' 28 the only
allegation of negligence appearing in the bill of particulars was
that the defendant's cab driver went through a stop sign. When
it later became clear that the stop sign in issue did not in fact exist,
plaintiff gave evidence of other acts of purported negligence. Objections to the testimony were overruled on the basis that the
additional allegations were, in fact, implied amendments to the
pleadings that served to conform the pleadings to the proof.
"The object of a bill of particulars is to amplify a pleading, to
limit proof and to prevent surprise. . . ." 19 As a result of the
purpose of avoiding surprise at trial, the bill of particulars, of
necessity, adds rigidity to the amendment of pleadings. "Restriction of a party to the legal theory . . .stated in a bill of particulars
seems antithetical to the elimination of the theory-of-the-pleadings
doctrine, which was one of the purposes of CPLR 3013."180 Perhaps it was for that reason that the bill of particulars was eliminated from federal practice in 1948.
124

Id. at 212, 168 N.E.2d at 658, 203 N.Y.S2d at 834.

12SSupra note 121.

126 See Nelson v. Schrank, 273 App. Div. 72, 75 N.Y.S.2d 761 (2d Dep't
1947).
127 CPLR 4103.
Misc. 2d -, 251 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
128.
129Elman v. Ziegfeld, 200 App. Div. 494, 497, 193 N.Y. Supp. 133, 136 (1st
Dep't 1922).
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